Hindi-Chini Bye-Bye: Has the relationship between India and China really reset?

21/11/2026

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When President Xi Jinping landed in New Delhi for the 18th BRICS summit, the media declared it to be a telltale sign of a much-needed, albeit ‘cautious’ diplomatic breakthrough after the clash in Galwan in 2020. Since the clash, diplomatic relations between the two neighbours have taken a nosedive and marked a period of nearly six years, marked by economic boycotts, border tensions and technological restrictions. A breakthrough, if achieved, could ease tensions and make the region’s peace and stability more likely. In other words, Xi’s return could also herald a return to pre-Galwan relations between India and China.

A thaw that wasn’t

The skirmish that took place between India and China in Galwan in June 2020 resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers, as per the official announcements. The clash had ripples beyond the borders as the diplomatic ties between the two remained strained.

As India took over the presidency of the 18th BRICS summit, it also paved the way for a possible renewal of their ties. Naturally, much of the media’s attention went to the fact that President Xi Jinping’s first visit since 2019 could signal progress. Opposing the view, however, Indo-China expert and a fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR), Dr Sidarth Raimedhi, said the relationship is “getting worse, not better”.

While the origin of the fallout lies in the Western Sector (Galwan), the core of the problem, however, lies in the Eastern sector. One of the most contested areas between India and China is the North-Eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. As per the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), China claims approximately 90,000 square kilometers of Arunachal land. Some senior China correspondents have hinted in interviews that “The border issue between India continues, and will remain to be to be a major irritant in the relationship, unless and until the issue is resolved, there will not be any improvement in the relationship”, a senior China correspondent told me in an interview.

The border issues are, unfortunately, far from over. In June and July of 2026, community organisations like the Nah Welfare Society and local media organisations such as The Arunachal Times alleged further encroachments by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The claims have since been rejected by the Indian Army, but by then media reports were flooded with further claims that the local Yak grazers were being driven away from the pastures around the borders. Interestingly, the claims resurfaced right before the commencement of the summit, which could be indicative of the chasm between on-ground realities and diplomatic optics.

Ajay Murtem, a public leader in Arunachal Pradesh and the chairman of the Citizens’ Rights Protection Forum, expressed his dissatisfaction with the BRICS Summit and said, “ They should discuss that such a type of intrusion should not happen because we are neighbours, Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai…” (Indians and Chinese are brothers) Murtem then highlighted the origin point of the problem to be the lack of infrastructure. The absence of proper roads, specifically in the Upper Subansiri district, is restricting the movement of the Indian Army, which consequently is leaving the border areas vulnerable. Murtem pointed out these specific areas: “There should be construction of a four-lane road or at least a two-lane road up to Maza”. China’s logistical network opposite Arunachal Pradesh has meanwhile continued to develop. The Lhasa-Nyingchi railway became operational in 2021, leaving Chinese railheads at Milin and Nyingchi roughly 20 km and 45 km from the Arunachal border, respectively.

Opposing the idea of a diplomatic reset, Raimedhi said, “there is no return to pre-2020 (relationship)”. Speaking about the irreversible changes in particular, he said, “One is the fact that the border has been militarised. So before 2020, Chinese force posture vis-à-vis the India border was very thin …but that has changed since then…this can’t go back.” The changes also have proof beyond military equipment, as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) traces these changes to the construction of ‘dual-use infrastructure’ that exist to serve military and civilian purposes. As a matter of fact, commercial satellites have established the presence of Xiaokang or villages that house barracks, garrison facilities, communications installations and logistical support infrastructure. Raimedhi described it as China “getting its logistical house in order”, considering that the PLA had to back down from Tawang in the winters of 1962 because of a lack of logistics. Naturally, this development opens up apprehensions about the future of this contestation.

Surely, the neighbours have mended things at least economically? The numbers say otherwise. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry reported a trade deficit of $112.16 billion in 2025-26 with China. While the imports far exceed the exports, China’s imports from India account for only $19.47 billion. Describing the state of trade relations, Raimedhi ended, “(India should) mentally accept that the future is grim.”

What Experts say is the “New normal”

“I think that India is going to have to walk more of a diplomatic tightrope in coming years,” former China correspondent and current Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) fellow Lara Farrar said while predicting the future trajectory of India-China relations. At the heart of this prediction lies a near-universal truth: China is an emerging superpower, and as Farrar elaborated, it is “deeply embedded” in crucial sectors, that includes global supply chains. All of India’s attempts towards a China boycott have not borne the results that it was hoping for, simply because India lacks the proper manufacturing environment that is needed to make it happen. Nowhere is this more evident than in the government’s own data, which puts India’s contribution to global value chains at 2.9 per cent and global merchandise exports at 1.8 per cent.

Trade and commerce experts have pointed out that on an immediate basis India needs to optimize its actions to achieve its manufacturing ambitions related to Make in India, which will necessarily require Chinese inputs and, in some sectors, investment, given the huge Chinese domination globally across a wide array of value-chains. In the medium to long term this dependence has to be strategically addressed in a determined manner. If we look around the world, India is not alone in terms of these strategic imperatives it faces. For instance, the iPhone, which is a key item of global consumption, and being produced in India also, has many components made in China. The world has no option but to depend on Chinese companies for the supply and manufacture of these components till supply chains can be diversified and derisked.

The Government’s 2025-26 economic survey indicates that large-scale manufacturing is not happening anytime soon; this implies that Chinese presence is not only inevitable, but essential in an immediate sense.
With relations headed for a less-than-ideal turn, and China’s inescapable influence in the market, it certainly piques curiosity as to the nature of this new ‘relationship’; Raimedhi opines that the relationship is going to be coercive and, more alarmingly, hegemonic.

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